Pivotal Deterrence: Third-Party Statecraft and the Pursuit of
Peace. By Timothy W. Crawford. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 2003. 304p. $39.95.
Pivotal deterrence highlights the problem of dual deterrence in which
one state (pivot) attempts to preserve the status quo and prevent
conflict between two revisionist adversaries, while each depends on the
pivot's support and/or neutrality for its ultimate success.
Timothy Crawford's book is an important and, in several ways,
original statement on a topic unduly ignored in past studies. In the
first two chapters, the author carefully lays out his theoretical
expectations concerning the conditions that make pivotal deterrence 1)
possible, 2) probable, and 3) likely to succeed. A set of necessary
conditions expected to make pivotal deterrence possible are clearly
outlined: The two adversaries must see each other as more threatening
than the pivot, whereas the pivot must be at least equal in power to
them, prefer the status quo between them, and believe that both
adversaries are revisionist and willing to go to war if assured of its
support.